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1Menace without Mandate? Is there any sympathy for ‘dissident’ Irish
Republicanism in Northern Ireland?
Abstract
Dissident Irish republicans have increased their violent activities in recent years. These
diehard ‘spoilers’ reject the 1998 Good Friday Agreement power-sharing deal between
unionist and nationalist traditions in Northern Ireland. Instead dissident IRAs vow to
maintain an armed campaign against Britain’s sovereign claim to Northern Ireland and have
killed British soldiers, police officers and civilians in recent years. These groups have small
political organisations with which they are associated. The assumption across the political
spectrum is that, whereas Sinn Fein enjoyed significant electoral backing when linked to the
now vanished Provisional IRA, contemporary violent republican ultras and their political
associates are utterly bereft of support. Drawing upon new data from the ESRC 2010
Northern Ireland election survey, the first academic study to ask the electorate its views of
dissident republicans, this article examines whether there are any clusters of sympathy for
these irreconcilables and their modus operandi. The piece assesses whether there are any
demographic, structural, ideological, religious or party trends indicating republican dissident
sympathies. It also assesses the extent to which dissidents are seen as a threat and
examines whether this perception is shared evenly across Northern Ireland’s two main
communities.
Introduction
Northern Ireland has witnessed an increase in dissident Irish republican violence in recent
years. The hopes of the British and Irish governments that the 1998 Good Friday Agreement,
introducing power sharing between the Protestant-Unionist-British and Catholic-
Nationalist-Irish traditions, would create an enduring peace and remove entirely the ‘armed
tradition’ associated with Northern Ireland, have been tempered by over 130 subsequent
deaths from political violence. Since the Good Friday Agreement was updated in 2006, via
the St Andrews Agreement, the activities of dissident Irish republican groupings, notably the
2Real IRA (RIRA) and Continuity IRA (CIRA) (and most recently Oglaigh na hEireann) have
confounded orthodoxy that armed Irish republicanism was consigned to history. Dissident
activity has existed ever since the Good Friday Agreement, the Real IRA killing 29 people in
the Omagh bombing shortly after the deal was concluded. Subsequent activity has been
episodic, but has never been entirely eradicated, the dissident IRAs killing two British
soldiers and two police officers since 2009. Dissidents purport to reject any political
agreement falling short of a British withdrawal from Northern Ireland and the establishment
of an independent united Ireland.
One question begged by the continuation of armed Irish republicanism, albeit in
much more sporadic form than that practised by the Provisional IRA (PIRA) from the 1970s
until the 1990s, is whether dissidents attract any public sympathy. Quantifying the extent of
sympathy for violent organisations or their political affiliates is difficult. One of the mantras
of the peace process, repeated by the British and Irish governments, the political parties
across the communal divide and the police, has been that dissident republicans are bereft of
any backing. To suggest otherwise risks talking up a disparate, seemingly desperate, band of
diehards. It also disturbs the orthodoxy that Northern Ireland lies securely in the box
marked ‘solved’. Yet the assumption that dissidents are entirely isolated has been mainly
that – an assumption, untroubled by much actual evidence, either way. This article uses new
data, drawn from the 2010 Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) Northern Ireland
General Election survey (a representative sample of 1,002 face-to-face interviews with the
region’s electorate)1 to examine whether there is any sympathy towards dissident
republican actions or organisations. The 2010 election survey was the first study to combine
questions on attitudes to dissident republican violence with an exploration of attitudes to
3the political alter egos of the dissident groups. In addition to examining the very limited
previous evidence concerning support for dissidents, the article draws upon evidence from
the ESRC survey to test whether dissidents are seen as a threat and analyses if there are
particular categories of the Northern Ireland population, identifiable via demographic and
attitudinal exploration, which may offer a modicum of sympathy to dissident republican
positions. Before examining this evidence, however, we need to understand the context in
which the armed Irish republican ‘tradition’ has been perpetuated, identify the groups
which have been ‘doing the perpetuating’ and assess the extent of their activity.
The enduring militant republican ‘tradition’
Few academics cautioned that post-Agreement armed republicanism might not become
extinct. Coakley (2004) and Hayes and McAllister (2001) were notable exceptions in their
contentions concerning the possible durability of the ‘physical force’ tradition and the ‘logic’
of continued violence. Martyn Frampton’s (2010: 286) detailed analysis has correctly
indicated that the growth of dissident republicanism reflects the capacity of a tradition to
endure and that its vitality has ‘not been determined by the waxing and waning of the
institutions in Northern Ireland’. Beyond academia, two themes have emerged. The
dissidents do now constitute a threat, but they have scant backing. MI5 has responsibility
for security intelligence in Northern Ireland. In 2010, its Head, Jonathan Evans, referred to a
‘a real and increasing security challenge in Northern Ireland’ , highlighting that there had
been 30 attacks on national security targets from January to September 2010, compared to
20 throughout 2009 and declaring:
4...our working assumption was that the residual threat from terrorism in Northern Ireland
was low and likely to decline further as time went on and as the new constitutional
arrangements there took root. Sadly that has not proved to be the case. On the contrary we
have seen a persistent rise in terrorist activity and ambition in Northern Ireland over the last
three years. Perhaps we were giving insufficient weight to the pattern of history over the
last hundred years which shows that whenever the main body of Irish republicanism has
reached a political accommodation and rejoined constitutional politics, a hardliner
rejectionist group would fragment off and continue the so-called ‘armed struggle’.
For Evans, there was, however:
a crucial difference from the position fifteen years ago. The Provisionals at their height
could claim the political support of a significant body of public opinion in Northern Ireland
and did develop a credible political strategy to operate alongside their terrorist campaign,
but we see little evidence of a viable political programme on the part of the dissident
republican splinter groups. Their political base is small and localised.
The British Prime Minister, David Cameron, used his address to 2010 Conservative
Party conference in Birmingham to insist that ‘as the threat of dissident Irish republican
terrorism increases we will protect our people with every means at our disposal’. Addressing
the same conference, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Owen Patterson,
declared:
There are still some dangerous armed groups out there, who want to destroy what has been
achieved and drag Northern Ireland back to its bloody past. And even though they have
virtually no popular support, their activities have increased in recent years. And we don’t
underestimate the threat that they pose. But they offer nothing and we will not let them
succeed.
Levels of sympathy for violence in Northern Ireland are notoriously difficult to judge.
With the arguable exception of Sinn Fein’s 1918 election victory,2 militant republicanism has
never enjoyed a popular majority amongst the Irish people, but it has endured, often in
limited form. Sinn Fein won over 100,000 votes in Northern Ireland at the 1955 General
5Election, fielding some republican prisoners as candidates, yet support was not converted
into backing for the IRA’s 1956-62 armed campaign. Sinn Fein did not contest elections from
1970 until 1981 but the Provisional IRA (PIRA) to which it was linked clearly enjoyed
significant, if unquantifiable, support during this period, without which it could not have
sustained its major armed campaign. When the extent of backing was tested electorally,
from 1982 onwards, Sinn Fein captured one-third of the nationalist vote, but only became
the majority nationalist party after the PIRA had declared a ceasefire.
As Augusteijn (2003: 22) notes, ‘reliance upon the will of the people has continued to
condition the [republican] movement away from simple elitism and led to an obsession with
legitimacy and democratic credentials’. Sinn Fein indeed travelled this journey. However, for
a rump of republican ultras, legitimacy and mandates are not drawn from contemporary
elections, but are instead taken from the historical ‘right’ of Irish people to resist a British
sovereign claim to any part of Ireland. The term ‘dissident’ to describe such ultras is
problematic, reducing Irish republicanism, an ideology with many strands and much
longevity, to a measurement against two organisations; the Provisional IRA and Sinn Fein,
from whose peace and political strategies militants dissent. Yet the Provisional IRA only
existed from 1970 until 2005 and began life as a dissident organisation, rejecting the
compromises offered by the ‘Official’ IRA. As such, it represents only one, temporary aspect
of Irish republicanism.
6Who are the ‘dissident’ republicans?
Use of the lumpen label of ‘dissident’ overlooks the considerable heterogeneity within
militant republicanism, itself divided over the utility of ‘armed struggle’ and split, often over
arcane disputes, over what constitutes authentic republican politics. Insofar as the term
dissident has meaning, it is to identify those republicans opposed to the Good Friday
Agreement. That deal is viewed by the differing strands of republican ‘ultra-ism’ as a
betrayal of the ideal of a united Ireland. Dissidents see the deal as a consolidation of
partition, merely allowing Sinn Fein a share of sectarian spoils via ministerial offices in a
Northern Ireland whose status is no longer seriously contested by that party. The extent to
which Sinn Fein has departed from republican principles is contested within republicanism
and amongst academics and journalists. As mere examples, Frampton’s (2009) academic
analysis denies the repudiation of republican beliefs and aspirations by Sinn Fein, whilst
acknowledging (2010) the propensity of diehards to always regard any compromises with
contempt, whereas the journalist Ed Moloney’s (2002) account of the peace process credits
the Sinn Fein President Gerry Adams with extraordinary Machiavellian powers in
hoodwinking republicans and steering them towards the compromises they had always
fervently opposed.
Dissidents emerged as early as 1986, with the formation of Republican Sinn Fein,
opposed to Sinn Fein’s recognition of the Irish Parliament at Leinster House, which presides
over the 26 Counties of the Irish Republic. Republican Sinn Fein argued that recognition of
one ‘partitionist’ parliament on the island of Ireland, not responsible for governing the
entire island, would ultimately lead to acceptance of a second partitionist institution, a
Northern Ireland legislature. This development duly occurred via the Good Friday
7Agreement, despite Sinn Fein’s Deputy Leader, Martin McGuinness, having offered at the
time of the 1986 split a commitment that the party had no intention of going into
Westminster or Stormont (abstention from Westminster remains) and that the IRA would
continue its armed campaign (Lynn 2002; Tonge 2004). McGuinness insisted that ‘ultimately
it is not votes but the cutting edge of the IRA that will end British rule in Ireland’ (BBC 1985).
Republican Sinn Fein’s founding President and leader until 2009, Ruairi O’Bradaigh, insists
that constitutional politics inevitably results in compromise, reform and an unsatisfactory
agreement falling well short of a sovereign united Ireland (White 2006). Republican Sinn
Fein’s emergence was followed ten years later by the emergence of the CIRA, whose
activities it promotes via the newspaper Saoirse, whilst denying formal links. Republican
Sinn Fein and CIRA offer ‘purist’ republicanism, rejecting both ‘partitionist’ parliaments on
the island of Ireland and claiming to eschew cooperation with other ‘impure’ republican
militants.
The 32 County Sovereignty Movement (32CSM), arose during the mid-1990s from
internal frustration within Sinn Fein over the party’s shift towards an agreement short of
securing a British commitment to withdraw from Northern Ireland. The militant grouping
was soon expelled from Sinn Fein. Although the connection is informal, the 32CSM tends to
propagandise Real IRA activity. The RIRA was formed in 1997, following the PIRA’s revival of
a ceasefire, in order to maintain some form of armed campaign against British rule and as
part of what was described as ‘a well-defined policy to protect and conserve traditional
republicanism’ (Mooney and O’Toole, 2003: 43). The RIRA’s limited growth was halted by its
killing of 29 civilians in the Omagh bombing in August 1998, only four months after the Good
Friday Agreement, but the organisation revived sufficiently to launch a low-level bombing
8campaign in England in 2000. Although dormant and internally divided for much of the
2000s, the standing down of the PIRA in 2005 and Sinn Fein’s decision, taken in 2007, to
support the Police Service of Northern Ireland, appeared to create new space for the RIRA.
An offshoot also appeared in the form of Oglaigh na hEireann and, combined, the
organisations began a new, episodic armed campaign. The political ambitions of the 32 CSM
do not differ from Republican Sinn Fein in terms of the absolute commitment to Irish unity.
Moreover, the sense of ‘betrayal’ by Sinn Fein unites dissidents. Both dissident groupings,
especially Republican Sinn Fein, rely upon historical determinism, grounded in the
inevitability of armed resistance to British rule, as a key resource for sustenance and morale.
There are, however, disagreements amongst dissident groupings over strategies and
tactics, the utility of ‘armed struggle’ and the desirability of mutual assistance. The 32 CSM
is far less concerned with the 26 County Irish parliament, effectively recognising its
legitimacy in presiding over the ‘liberated’ part of Ireland. For Republican Sinn Fein, the
willingness to accept the 26 County Irish parliament has been described as the ‘biggest
betrayal ever’ (O’Neill 2005) even though it was followed by far more dramatic political u-
turns in subsequent years. The emphasis from the founders of Republican Sinn Fein has
been upon how ‘traditional republicans didn’t fight and lay down their lives for a reformed
Stormont, nor for a puppet government in Leinster House’ (George Harrison, cited in English
2003: 316). The generational transmission of an unyielding, inflexible ideology is sloganised
by Republican Sinn Fein as ‘continuity not compromise’.
For the 32 CSM, the downgrading by Sinn Fein of all that was principle to the status
of mere tactics is also excoriated, as is the content of the Good Friday Agreement. This was
most famously and pithily expressed by Bernadette Sands-McKevitt, sister of Bobby Sands,
9the first republican to die in the 1981 republican hunger strikes, who declared that ‘Bobby
did not die for cross-border bodies with executive powers. He did not die for nationalists to
be equal British citizens within the Northern Ireland state’ (cited in English, 2003: 317). It is
the ‘liberation’ of the ‘North’ that matters to the 32 CSM, not arcane disputes concerning
the legitimacy of the Dublin parliament. Moreover, unlike Republican Sinn Fein, the 32 CSM
is prepared to make common cause with other groups, arguing for example, in its Easter
2009 statement, that ‘all republican banners are welcome because all republican banners
are needed and that republicanism could not simply rely upon old ‘theological’ certainties:
We need to set our case against British occupation in a way that is relevant to our people’s
needs today. Our aims cannot solely be the product of the past nor can they be a slave to
that past. British reasons for remaining in Ireland will change according to modern British
interests. Republican strategies opposing these interests must adapt accordingly (Sovereign
Nation, May-June 2009).
Beyond the political cheerleaders of the armed groups exists the Republican
Network for Unity, an organisation formed principally by former republican prisoners
(mainly ex-PIRA) and which attempts to provide an umbrella for the disparate groupings
rejecting the Good Friday Agreement. Republican Network for Unity claims not to support
an armed campaign, with some former prisoners arguing that if the PIRA’s violence failed to
achieve goals, there is little prospect of dissident IRAs achieving more. The non-support (but
not condemnation) of ‘armed struggle’ is also true of Eirigi, a republican organisation which
does not have an armed wing and argues for socialist politics. There are also a number of
independent, non-party political republican societies. These were formed after Sinn Fein’s
decision to support the PSNI and condemnation of continuing republican armed actions,
including Martin McGuinness’s denunciation of the perpetrators of the 2009 killings of
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British Army soldiers and a police officer as ‘traitors to Ireland’. Hardline republicans insisted
that McGuinness ‘did not speak for us’ (McCaughey 2010) a viewpoint reinforced by Brian
Arthurs, a former PIRA member who left Sinn Fein in 2008:
No one can deny that there have been changes in the North, but is an equality agenda being
pursued [by Sinn Fein]. People did not die, they did not take up arms, for equality. They did
so for Irish freedom. Yet a huge £100m MI5 building has been built in the North and 5,000
British soldiers remain here. A special British military intelligence unit has just been
deployed in Derry...as republicans we were committed to fight on until Britain made a
declaration of intent to withdraw from Ireland... It can be argued that that an armed
campaign is not advisable at this point in time but it will never be right to inform on those
who decided otherwise (Sunday Tribune, 24 October 2010).
Dissident republican activity and communal asymmetry of threat perception
The Good Friday Agreement did not end violence related to the security situation in
Northern Ireland. Between 2000-1 and 2009-10 there were 1,820 shootings and 1,012
bombings in the region (Police Service of Northern Ireland 2010: 4). Between April 2009 and
March 2010 alone, there were 127 casualties of paramilitary shootings and assaults (more
than double the 61 recorded in the previous year) whilst almost 35,000 rounds of
ammunition were found and 169 persons were arrested under the Terrorism Act in relation
to the security situation in Northern Ireland, with 36 charged (Ibid: 3). The 2009-10 total for
bombings and shootings had already been matched by 31 August 2010 in the following
year’s (April 2010 to March 2011) tally. Meanwhile, incidents with a sectarian motivation
totalled 7,249 from April 2005 to the end of July 2009, a rate of 139 per month, whilst
sectarian crimes amounted to 5,234 during the same period, a monthly average of 95
(Police Service of Northern Ireland 2009).
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In November 2009, the Independent Monitoring Commission, which tallied
paramilitary activity for the British and Irish governments from 2004-10, reported that the
CIRA and RIRA were ‘extremely active and dangerous’ and that ‘dissident republican activity
since the summer of 2008 had been consistently more serious than at any time since we had
started to report it in April 2004’. (Independent Monitoring Commission 2009: 4-5). The
Commission’s warnings were followed in September 2010 by the raising of the dissident
republican threat in Britain from ‘moderate’ to ‘substantial’ by the British government,
meaning that an attack is considered a strong possibility.
Yet dissident activity has produced markedly different perceptions of the threat
these ultras constitute, according to religion (and, by default therefore in Northern Ireland,
membership of the Unionist or Nationalist communities). Table 1 indicates that Unionists
may fear the rise of the old problem of the IRA, whereas Nationalists are less troubled by
the ‘rebirth’ of armed republicanism. Asked in the 2010 Northern Ireland election survey
whether the ‘dissidents’ constituted a ‘major’, ‘minor’ or ‘no’ threat, the reaction of a
majority (53 per cent) of Protestants in the survey is to view dissidents as a ‘major threat’,
compared to only 17 per cent of Catholics who think likewise. Overall, only 7 per cent of
those surveyed dismissed the ‘micro-groups’ as ‘no threat’. The differences have been
reflected in the coverage offered by Northern Ireland’s daily newspapers. The nationalist
Irish News has tended to play down the problem, whereas the Unionist News Letter has
highlighted concerns over the rise of dissident activity.3 Unionist perceptions have leant
towards that of the return of the old ‘IRA bogeyman’.
[Table 1 about here.]
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Perceptions of the scale of the threat posed by dissidents also vary, although to a
lesser extent, according to age. Those of more advanced years and sceptical of prospects for
a permanently peaceful polity, having lived through sustained conflict, are more fearful of
the perpetuation of violence, whereas young people, with little or no memory of the 1970-
1998 phase of conflict, appear more sanguine.
[Table 2 about here.]
Community background, determined by religion, and age, are thus important
indicators (much more so than class or denomination) in terms of how dissident activity is
viewed. The strong sense of threat felt by many Protestants is despite the lack of targeting
of their community. It is Catholic police officers, recruited on a 50-50 quota basis with non-
Catholics, who have been targeted particularly, as part of a dissident strategy designed to
deter those from a nationalist background joining the PSNI and enhancing its legitimacy.
Assessing the extent of sympathy for ‘dissidents’: the data
Prior to the 2010 Northern Ireland General Election survey, only two surveys, both
conducted for the BBC Northern Ireland Hearts and Minds programme, in 2002 and 2006
respectively, had listed Republican Sinn Fein or the 32 CSM as options for respondents.
Combined support for these groups in each poll came to 7 per cent of nationalists, a small, if
not negligible, showing. However, in the only election where dissident tested their support,
the 2007 Northern Ireland Assembly contest, they managed to achieve only 3 per cent of
the nationalist vote, amounting to only 8,000 votes. Due to prohibitions placed upon their
organisations, ‘Republican Sinn Fein’ candidates were obliged to stand as ‘independents’,
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given party policy which declines to repudiate ‘armed struggle’ for Irish unity. The Electoral
Authorities (Northern Ireland) Act 1989 and subsequent updating legislation requires
election candidates to renounce proscribed organisations (the CIRA and RIRA are both
illegal) and also renounce terrorism connected with the affairs of Northern Ireland.
The candidate label issue may not have assisted, but outright rejection and the
certainty of Sinn Fein victories in most of the areas contested were probably far more
important in explaining dissident ‘under-performance’ relative to the Hearts and Minds
polls. The poor electoral performance led to further scorn being heaped upon dissidents
from ‘mainstream’ republicans in Sinn Fein. To question Sinn Fein’s political changes has
risked ostracism and isolation within nationalist communities where the party enjoys a
hegemonic position. Many former IRA prisoners have been elected as Sinn Fein
representatives or hold prominent positions within the local state. Shirlow et al (2010)
found that only 15 per cent of former prisoners could be classified as ‘neo-dissidents’,
unconvinced by the new political direction of Sinn Fein and still prepared to offer sympathy
to those engaged in continuing ‘armed struggle’ , although a higher percentage suggested
that those republicans currently imprisoned were ‘political prisoners’.
So what is the real extent of sympathy for dissident republicanism? In order to test
this, four exploratory questions were deployed in the 2010 ESRC Northern Ireland General
Election survey. One asked the level of sympathy (‘a lot’, ‘a little’, or ‘none’) with ‘the
reasons why some Republican groups (such as the Real IRA and Continuity IRA) and often
called “dissident republicans” continue to use violence, even if you don’t condone the
violence itself’. A second asked whether respondents ‘strongly support’, ‘support’, ‘neither
support nor oppose’, ‘oppose’ or ‘strongly oppose’ the Police Service of Northern Ireland’,
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the force which replaced the Royal Ulster Constabulary in 2001 in a bid to achieve cross-
community acceptance of policing. A third question asked electors if they ‘strongly agreed’,
‘agreed’, ‘neither agreed nor disagreed’,’ disagreed’ or ‘strongly disagreed’ with the
proposition that ‘the Police Service of Northern Ireland is very similar to the old Royal Ulster
Constabulary’. Finally, respondents were asked whether they ‘strongly liked’, ‘liked’, ‘neither
liked nor disliked’, ‘disliked’, or ‘strongly disliked’ Republican Sinn Fein and the 32 CSM. The
raw percentage scores are reported in Table 3.4
[Table 3 about here.]
The overall figure of 8.2 per cent declaring that they have ‘sympathy for the reasons
why some republican groups (such as the Real and Continuity IRAs) continue to use
violence’ might be seen as surprisingly high, amounting to 14 per cent of nationalists, using
the survey weighting and approximating to almost one-third of those self-identifying as
nationalists. Levels of attraction to Republican Sinn Fein and the 32 CSM, associated with
the CIRA and RIRA, are also small but not negligible. Given the tendency of survey
respondents to produce ‘socially acceptable’ answers, which resulted in a severe under-
reporting of Sinn Fein’s vote in opinion polls throughout the Troubles, when the party was
‘inextricably linked’ to the IRA, these figures in terms of dissident sympathy could be
interpreted as a possible understatement of dissident leanings. Eleven per cent of
respondents (approximately 18 per cent of nationalist background respondents) believed
the PSNI to be very similar to the old RUC.
Several important caveats must however be highlighted. Firstly, the use of the term
‘sympathy for the reasons for dissident violence’, with the rider that the respondent need
not condone such violence, is palpably a ‘softer’ option than asking a question directly
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asking whether someone ‘supports’ violence. Nonetheless, it is a legitimate question,
deployed in previous Northern Ireland surveys, given that if the term ‘support’ is used it can
be avoided. A common republican reply regarding past violence was that no-one
‘supported’ violence; rather it was a very unfortunate ‘consequence’ of British rule in
Northern Ireland. As such, there is no guarantee that the use of the term ‘support’ would
have elicited representative replies. Secondly, a liking for either Republican Sinn Fein (who
may be confused by some respondents with the ‘main’ Sinn Fein) or the 32 CSM may not
translate into (wasted) votes for either, even should they ever contest elections. Thirdly,
believing that the PSNI is similar to the RUC (the highest figure on the tests applied) does
not automatically equate to dissident sympathy. Fourthly, the figure of almost one-third of
those self-identifying as nationalists sympathising with the reasons for dissident violence
may appear startling. However, only 24 per cent of all respondents identified themselves as
nationalists, a figure which matches exactly the level of nationalist identification in the most
recent (2009) of the annual Northern Ireland Life and Times surveys of political (and other)
opinion (www.ark.ac.uk/nilt/2009/Political_Attitudes/UNINATID.html). Northern Ireland
electors are eschewing the traditional unionist and nationalist labels, 42 per cent rejecting
such labelling in the ESRC 2010 study (43 per cent did likewise in the 2009 Life and Times
survey). Expressed as one-third of one-quarter of all respondents, the dissident sympathy
figure is much less striking.
It is important to emphasise that no demographic category comes close to displaying
an overall proclivity to sympathy for dissidence. What does emerge, however, are clusters
where there is at least a measurable level of sympathy.5 Those who do indicate dissident
leanings are found in what intuitively might be regarded as the most likely categories: they
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are predominantly male and youngish, being mainly aged below 45. As one might expect,
opposition to the PSNI is age and community related and there is a monotonic increase in
support for the police service the older the respondent. Young Catholics, especially working-
class males, are least likely to support the PSNI, even though it is older Catholics who have
been politically socialised over many years to reject a Northern Ireland police force.
Religiously practising older Protestants are most likely to back the PSNI, with professionals
also particularly likely to offer backing. Almost one-in-five Catholics agree that the PSNI is
similar to the RUC and there is no age trend. The working class most sees the similarity.
In terms of sympathy with the reasons for dissident republican violence, the only age
group reaching 15 per cent sympathy overall is the 26-35 category. All other age groups fall
within the 5 per cent to 10 per cent band. Infrequent religious worshippers and the non-
religious tend to be more sympathetic than regular churchgoers. Sympathy is highest among
the working class and routine non-manual workers, where it reaches 10 per cent. Again, the
26-35 age category yields the highest percentage of those who strongly like or like the
dissident republican political groups. Patterns of support in respect of religiosity and social
class are similar to those found in respect of expressed sympathy for the reasons behind the
violence. Older people (over-65) are most hostile to the dissident groupings; younger people
are more likely to indicate support and there is also a high level of ambivalence
(approaching 25 per cent) amongst the under 35s. Whilst dissident organisations draw their
backing from those within the ‘Catholic community’, a large portion of their (limited)
support do not identify as belonging to a particular religion.
Method
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We now need to go beyond such descriptive data to assess what, if anything, assumes
significance as an identifier of dissident sympathies. The indicators of possible sympathy for
dissident Republicanism are quite disparate in their content and coding and consequently,
whilst it would be of potential interest to construct a dissidence sympathy scale, and test
the underlying social and attitudinal predictors of this, any combination of the items used in
Table 3 may have insufficient validity because of underlying dimensionality to responses.
Moreover, some individual items may suffer from ambiguity relating in interpretation: the
question regarding whether the PSNI represents a change from the RUC, for example, has a
number of different possible interpretations, which may not necessarily indicate dissidence.
We therefore limit ourselves to testing sympathy for dissidence as tapped by the
question least prone to ambiguity, namely the question regarding sympathy for the reasons
for dissident violence. We code this 1 for a lot or a little sympathy, and 0 for no sympathy.
All other responses are excluded. Substantively, this is also the most interesting question –
in a post-Good Friday Agreement Northern Ireland, sympathy for the reasons behind the
most aggressive forms of Republicanism, as opposed to views on political actors or
manifestations of institutional outcomes, PSNI included, indicates a possible social
encapsulation of attitudes promoted as anachronistic and untenable by the mainstream
process.
In the resulting binary logit model, we introduce key sociodemographic variables as
possible explanatory variables of sympathy for Republican violence. In addition to a gender
control, we include a categorical measure of age in six bands (18-25; 26-35; 36-45; 46-55;
56-65, and the reference, over 65); a six-category Goldthorpe measure of class, based upon
current or previous occupation (professionals and salariat; routine non-manual; self-
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employed; technicians, supervisors and skilled manual; semi-skilled and unskilled manual;
and a not employed reference), following analyses linking political support and radicalism to
class bases6; and a three-category religious variable, contrasting practising and non-
practising Catholic categories together with a ‘other / no religion’ reference category.
We also include two attitudinal measures. Firstly, we tap ‘normal’ political attitudes,
using the survey’s 11-point left-right scale in which respondents were invited to place
themselves on an axis. This political attitudinal heuristic has been seen as increasingly
salient in a Northern Ireland politics traditionally defined by the sectarian cleavage.
Secondly, we include a nationalism item, tapping respondents’ self-identification as
nationalist or not through a simple dummy variable. We would expect nationalist identifiers
to be more likely to sympathise with dissident violence. Lastly, we include one of the
previous measures of dissidence sympathy, namely the questions tapping support for the
longest-standing ‘dissident’ Republican organisation, Republican Sinn Fein, coding this 1 for
respondents expressing a positive view (strongly like or like).7 Clearly, we might expect an
individual supporting a party closely associated with dissidence to be more likely to have
sympathy for violence than someone who condemns Republican dissidence. However, it is
evident that covariance between nationalist self-identification and support for Republican
SF is likely to be high,8 washing out one or other of the items when included together. We
therefore expect to run a separate model including just the eventual non-significant item to
check for such collinearity. Model 1, then, includes the sociodemographic predictors alone.
Model 2 adds the two attitudinal items and the party support item. Finally, Model 3
provides a simple diagnostic of association between nationalism and support for Republican
Sinn Fein, Model 2 having identified independent effects for each.
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The Model and Analysis
Table 4 presents the findings of the three models.
[Table 4 about here.]
Looking firstly at Model 1, there are no significant effects amongst the age or gender
controls. Confirming the descriptive analysis, sympathy for dissidence appears greater
amongst those for whom the conflict already existed in their formative years (26-55 year
olds), but the effect does not reach significance. Sympathy for dissidence is greater amongst
males but again the gender effect does not reach significance.
However, religiosity effects are significant. Practising Catholics are significantly more
hostile towards dissidence than non-practising Catholics, who do not appear to be
significantly different from those of other / no religion, in their attitudes towards dissidents.
Clearly religious practice, rather than religion per se, matters, as those exercising their
Catholic faith regard continued violence as unwarranted and morally wrong. This might be
seen as unsurprising, given the unremitting hostility of the Catholic Church to successive IRA
campaigns. During the years of the ‘main’ conflict, when Sinn Fein was linked to the
Provisional IRA, practising Catholics were far more likely to support the more constitutional
nationalists of the SDLP, controlling for the usual socio-demographic variables (McAllister
2004).
Of some surprise is the class profile of those registering sympathy for the reasons
behind dissident republican violence, inasmuch as there are almost no significant
differences between groups. The only group reaching significance is the self-employed,
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which is less likely to support dissidence. Whilst support for militant republicanism in Ireland
has never been confined to the working-class (particularly outside urban areas), structural
disadvantages pertaining to the nationalist section of that class played a significant role in
fuelling support for the PIRA. Any sympathy for dissidents may be drawn from a more
eclectic class base and is not reducible to social class. This suggests that the structural basis
to militant republicanism may have expired; the limited numbers sympathising with
dissidents may offer backing for other reasons than inferior social position.
Although dissidence is not reducible to social class, turning to the attitudinal items
included in Model 2, respondents identifying themselves further to the right are less likely
to sympathise with dissidence compared to other respondents.9 Those who perceive
themselves as left-wing are more likely to offer succour to the dissidents. The adoption of
left-wing attitudes may occur irrespective of social class and such attitudes concur with the
avowed positions of dissident groups. Whilst republican militants might be dismissed as
unreconstructed ‘Green fascists’ by their many opponents, they purport to offer a
democratic socialist agenda and have attempted to popularise their political approach in
recent times with threats made against bankers and capitalists.
Most marked of all, however, is that those self-identifying as nationalist are more
likely to support dissidence. Those amongst the population who unashamedly label
themselves as Irish nationalist are significantly more likely to offer sympathy to the reasons
for dissident violence (not necessarily the violence itself, it is important to reiterate). A very
substantial proportion (one-third) of the nationalist community supported Sinn Fein when
the Provisional IRA was active from 1982 until 1997, fighting unambiguously for full British
withdrawal from Northern Ireland. Votes cast for Sinn Fein during that era might be
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interpreted as indicators of sympathy for ‘armed struggle’. Not all such sympathy is likely to
have magically dissipated, given the non-realisation of a united Ireland, even amid the
palpably changed political situation in Northern Ireland, with Sinn Fein now playing
prominent roles in a power-sharing government.
As expected, the other nationalist item, namely the Republican Sinn Fein variable, is
not significant, given the strong association with nationalist identity, and so we include it
separately, without the nationalist item, in Model 3. Here the strength and significance of
supporting this party, the longest-standing dissident group, increases markedly as a
predictor of sympathy for the reasons for dissident violence, although it is not as strong in
its effect as the previous nationalist item, unsurprisingly so given that Republican Sinn Fein
remains very much a fringe ultra party of no electoral significance.10 Also, notably, the
model fit does not decline substantially, and is still a major improvement on Model 1.
From the lack of independent effect in Model 2, then, it is evident that a liking for
Republican Sinn Fein, a marginal party, is of far less importance than nationalist
identification in an era where nationalist (and unionist) labels are diminishing relative to
avowed ‘non-alignment’ in the zero-sum ideological game in Northern Ireland. Nationalism
is the main, but not the sole basis for support for dissidence, as the Left-Right dimension
retains importance, with those identifying themselves as left-wing most likely to support
dissidence.11 Moreover, it is notable that the coefficient remains identical across Models 2
and 3. Previous research confirming Left-Right and nationalist identification as orthogonal
remains valid. It perhaps should be asked whether sympathy for dissidence from the most
left-wing elements is a causal factor or simply a covariate. Those from the radical Republican
core have historically identified with strong socialist ideologies. That they still do may be
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evidence of their continued fidelity to this, rather than a political motivation to sympathy
for violence per se.
The inclusion of the nationalist item does not wash out the religious antipathy effect.
On the contrary, the disparity between the practising Catholic reference and all other
religious categories becomes stronger, and the non-practising Catholic category contrast
even attains significance. Once the confounding nationalist effect has been controlled for,
sympathy for dissidence amongst those practising as Catholics, or at least identifying
themselves as members of that religion, is even less evident.
Conclusion
A mandate from the living continues to elude dissident republicans (and will surely continue
to do so) who claim justification from the martyrdom of the ‘patriot dead’. Nonetheless,
there is some limited evidence that the isolation of republican ultras, although considerable,
is perhaps not quite as utterly comprehensive as might previously have been assumed or
declared. A level of popular support is important in maintaining an armed campaign,
although quantifying levels of backing remains difficult. The Provisional IRA fought its ‘war’
from 1970 until 1981 without votes being cast for its political arm, Sinn Fein and clearly had
some, even considerable, popularity but never held a majority mandate. Nonetheless, Sinn
Fein has tended to contrast the contemporary lack of support for dissidents with the 1970-
1997 conflict as if ‘Provisionalism’ was a mass movement, rather than one backed merely by
a bigger minority of the minority population in Northern Ireland.
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For those whose ‘war’ has still not ended, the supposed ‘mandate’ comes from the
necessity of resistance to ‘foreign occupation’ and from history, via the supposed popular
will of the Irish people when last expressed as a single unit, in 1918. There remain those
impervious to pleas to abandon residual sympathy for the violence with which Irish
republicanism has often been historically associated. Two earlier BBC surveys have indicated
the republican hardcore, if measured in terms of support for Republican Sinn Fein and/or
the 32 County Sovereignty Movement, the political ‘associates’ of dissident IRAs, to amount
to around 7 per cent. Our more recent evidence, drawn from the 2010 ESRC election survey,
suggests some sympathy exists towards the reasons for dissident violence, but it is
questionable whether that will ever translate into electoral support for dissident
organisations, should they decide (or be allowed) to contest elections under their current
names. Our figure of 14 per cent of those from a nationalist background who sympathise
with the reasons for dissident republican violence is higher when the population is reduced
to those self-identifying as nationalists.
Dissident sympathisers are drawn from the ‘Green-Red’ strata of society, nationalists
of a left-wing orientation. The ‘Green’ element is not to be confused with Green Catholic
nationalism; Catholics, especially practising ones, are demonstrably unsympathetic to
dissident republicanism. Rather, the dissident sympathisers are drawn from those who
readily identify as nationalist (only one-quarter of the population) and fuse their nationalism
with socialism not religion. However, these two ideological traits are not reducible to social
class, which is not significant in terms of dissident sympathies. This may be because, unlike
situational and structural Provisional urban working-class republicanism, rooted in social
context and conditions of relative disadvantage, dissident republicanism is a reversion to
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the older, ideological and territorial form not amenable to structural amelioration (see also
Patterson 2011). Perhaps contrary to expectations therefore, dissident republican
sympathies are not structurally determined, nor are there particularly strong demographic
factors at work. Instead, dissident sympathies appear to be products of ideological choice,
based upon deep nationalism. This is similar to the marginal militant republicanism which
flickered, largely inconsequentially but with considerable enduring commitment from
adherents, in Northern Ireland for much of the state’s existence. The ‘structural
republicanism’ of the Provisionals, whilst hugely destabilising at its height, was not
necessarily deeply ideological (McIntyre 1995).
There exist a modestly sized group of people, reduced considerably from the main
era of conflict in the late C20th, still not reconciled to the partition of Ireland, unsupportive
of the political and policing institutions of Northern Ireland and sympathetic to dissident
organisations. The capacity for growth of this grouping may be limited. Moreover, it is
important to distinguish between sympathy for the reasons for dissident violence and
unequivocal support, which can only be tested by actions and by explicitly frank survey
questions which may not elicit honest responses. We tentatively suggest that a ‘they-have-
no- support’ narrative for dissidents may need to switch to a critique based more upon the
futility of an armed campaign in attaining long-term political goals. Additionally, perception
may be more important than reality. The clear asymmetry in threat perception, with
Unionists much more fearful of dissident IRAs than nationalists, demonstrates how older
fears remain embedded in the Unionist psyche. Yet, whilst some republican violence
towards Unionists remains evident in, for example, attacks upon Orange halls, a dissident
republican modus operandi has been to target Catholic police officers, due to ease of such
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targeting and to deter other Catholics from joining. The absence of large-scale support for
dissidents within the nationalist community has not yet removed the traditional fears of
many Unionists over the nature of republican violence.
NOTES
1 The 1,002 face-to-face interviews, based on a 90-question questionnaire, were conducted
by MRNI in the three weeks immediately after the 2010 General Election, across each of
Northern Ireland’s 18 parliamentary constituencies, using clustered stratified random
sampling. The full results data file, sampling method and questionnaire are all archived at
the Economic and Social Data Service, SN6653.
2 In The Politics of Antagonism: Understanding Northern Ireland, Brendan O’Leary and John
McGarry question the comprehensiveness of Sinn Fein’s mandate even in 1918, pointing out
the large number of uncontested seats and highlighting that Sinn Fein ‘only’ won 56 per
cent of the vote. Even Sinn Fein’s former Director of Publicity, Danny Morrison, in his book
The Good Old IRA (1985, Belfast: Sinn Fein) accepted that the 1918 vote was not really a
vote for violence. See also Brian Hanley’s book, The IRA – A Documentary History 1916-
2005, 2010, Dublin: Gill and Macmillan).
3 See as examples the editorial, ‘Dissident support a wake-up call’, News Letter, 6 October
2010 and Alex O’Kane’s article, ‘Wrong to dismiss the dissident threat’, News Letter, 11
October 2010.
4 With hindsight, the questionnaire on which the face-to-face interviews were based might
usefully have deployed some follow-up questions to those indicating sympathy with the
reasons for dissident violence, or the perception that the PSNI is similar to the RUC, to ask
why such views are held. In mitigation a) the questionnaire was already very long due to the
26
mass of election questions b) we perhaps underestimated the reported level of sympathy
and c) this was the first quantitative foray into levels of sympathy for ‘dissidents’.
5 A full set of the demographic descriptives are available from the authors on request.
6 For general examples of this see T.H.Greene’s classic study, Comparative Revolutionary
Movements, London: Prentice Hall (1974). For a class-based Northern Ireland analysis of the
evolution of Irish republicanism see Pat Walsh’s Irish Republicanism and Socialism: The
Politics of the Republican Movement, Belfast: Blackstaff (1994).
7 We would have liked to include a similar parameter for 32 CSM support. However, the
number of supporters of this party in the dataset was too small to allow this to be modelled
robustly.
8 Indeed, the chi-square score for the association between these two items is very high –
162.87 (1df, p <.001).
9 Left-Right position was included as a single continuous scale, rather than categorised, to
ration degrees of freedom. A reduced model including Left-Right categorisation broadly
confirms the same monotonic trend, with only the Moderate Left bucking the trend by
missing significance, probably due to very small numbers placing themselves at points 2 and
3 on the scale. This model is available from the authors on request.
10 We were aware that some respondents might confuse Republican Sinn Fein with Sinn
Fein and tested for this using another survey question which asked views of all parties,
which yielded divergent views of the two. Running the dissident models using both parties ,
only liking for Republican Sinn Fein yielded significance in terms of dissident sympathy (in
Model 3).
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11 As in previous surveys, Catholic respondents offer more left-wing responses than others.
However, when religious affiliation is controlled for, the effect remains.
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Table 1 Perceptions of the ‘dissident’ threat by religion
% Catholic Protestant Other
Major threat 17.2 53.0 26.3
Minor threat 34.0 22.9 26.3
No threat 9.8 3.5 7.9
Don’t know 26.6 17.9 36.8
Refused 12.4 2.7 2.6
N 429 515 38
Source: ESRC Northern Ireland General Election Survey, 2010
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Table 2 Perceptions of the ‘dissident’ threat by age
% 18-25 26-35 36-45 46-55 56-65 Over 65
Major threat 23.5 30.7 39.5 40.0 40.9 42.1
Minor threat 20.0 35.2 28.9 26.9 32.1 22.0
No threat 7.6 8.9 6.8 5.5 4.4 3.8
Don’t know 42.4 20.7 16.8 17.2 14.5 23.3
Refused 6.5 4.5 7.9 10.3 8.2 8.8
N 170 179 190 145 159 159
Source: ESRC Northern Ireland General Election survey 2010.
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Table 3 Attitudes to dissident violence, dissident groups and the Police Service of Northern
Ireland (%)
Lot of
sympathy
A little
sympathy
No
sympathy
Don’t
know
Refused
Sympathy
with reasons
for dissident
violence
4.4 3.8 75.3 5.6 10.9
Strongly
support
Support Neither
support
nor
oppose
Oppose Strongly
oppose
Don’t
know
Refused
Police
Service of
Northern
Ireland
24.6 30.6 30.8 2.3 1.5 6.4 3.8
Strongly
agree
Agree Neither
agree nor
disagree
Disagree Strongly
disagree
Don’t
know
Refused
The Police
Service of
Northern
Ireland is
very similar
to the old
Royal Ulster
Constabulary
1.7 9.5 35.4 16.4 14.2 19.2 3.6
Strongly
like
Like Neither
like nor
dislike
Dislike Strongly
dislike
Don’t
know
Refused
Republican
Sinn Fein 3.3 4.5 17.1 5.9 45.0 10.6 13.7
32 CSM 0.7 3.1 22.5 3.6 42.7 13.7 13.8
N= 1002
Source: ESRC Northern Ireland General Election Survey 2010
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Table 4 Binary logistic regression predicting support for dissident violence by social profile
and political attitudes
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
B s.e. B s.e. B s.e.
Constant -1.71* .84 1.60 1.01 1.36 .99
Female -0.46 .31 -0.56 .34 -0.50 .33
Age
18-25 -0.73 .71 -1.05 .76 -1.13 .77
26-35 0.76 .52 0.28 .57 0.38 .56
36-45 0.50 .53 0.21 .58 0.27 .57
46-55 0.72 .54 0.75 .59 0.89 .59
56-65 -0.01 .59 -0.16 .63 -0.11 .63
Over 65 - - - - - -
Religion
Practising Catholic -1.68* .74 -3.62*** .89 -2.65** .76
Non-practising Catholic 0.49 .36 -1.09* .63 -.02 .44
Other /no religion - - - - - -
Occupation
Professionals and salariat 0.25 .67 0.13 .72 0.37 .73
Routine non-manual 0.14 .64 0.16 .69 0.26 .70
Self-employed -1.47* .84 -1.26 .92 -1.06 .90
Technicians, supervisors and
skilled manual -0.52 .69 -0.32 .72 -0.25 .73
Semi-skilled and unskilled
manual -0.18 .62 -0.18 .65 -0.02 .67
Not employed - - - - - -
Political positions
Left-Right (0-10) -0.44*** .07 -0.44*** .07
Nationalist 1.76** .66
Strongly like or like
Republican Sinn Fein? 0.33 .56 0.89* .52
N 653
Model chi-square 33.83*** (13df) 93.33*** (16df) 84.68*** (15df)
Nagelkerke pseudo-R2 .11 .30 .27
* p < 0.1 ** p < .01 *** p < .001
